The alignment of collective goals and individual behavior has been extensively studied by economists under a principal-agent framework. Two main solutions have been presented: explicit incentive contracts and monitoring. These solutions correspond to changes in the objective situation faced by individuals. However, an extensive literature in social psychology provides evidence that behavior is in ‡uenced, not only by situational constraints, but also by attitudes. Therefore, an important aspect of organization is to choose the structures and procedures that best contribute to the dissemination of the desired attitudes throughout the organization. This paper studies how the initial con…guration of attitudes and the size of the organization a¤ect the optimal organizational structure and the timing of information ‡ows when the objective is to align the members'attitudes. We identify and characterize three factors that a¤ect the optimal organizational structures and procedures and the degree of alignment of attitudes: (1) clustering e¤ects; (2) member cross-in ‡uence e¤ects; and (3) leader cross-in ‡uence e¤ects.
Introduction
A fundamental issue of organization is the de…nition of the structures and procedures that deal e¢ ciently with the problem of motivation, i.e., that ensure that the di¤erent members willingly make their contribution to the cooperative activity. The motivation problem has been extensively studied in the economics literature under a principal-agent framework (e.g., Ross, 1973; Holmström, 1982; Holmström and Milgrom, 1994) . The problem of aligning individual behavior and collective goals is not a trivial one, due to moral hazard. Moral hazard arises when actions which have e¢ ciency implications are not easily observable and individuals may act in their own interest, not paying the due attention to the collective goals of the organization. Two main solutions to the motivation problem have been advanced by agency theorists. The …rst is an increase in the resources spent on monitoring and veri…cation. The second consists of using explicit incentive contracts.
Even if actions are not observable, contracts may be designed which are contingent upon observed outcomes, rewarding success and creating incentives for good behavior.
These two solutions have something in common. They correspond to changes in the objective situation faced by individuals and build on the idea that extrinsic incentives in‡uence individual behavior. As explicitly recognized by several economists (e.g., Radner, 1992; Bernheim, 1994; Kreps, 1997; Gibbons, 1998) , behavior in organizations is determined, not only by economic incentives, but also by socio-psychological factors that a¤ect individual preferences. These socio-psychological factors are terra incognita for standard microeconomics. In contrast, the concept of attitude has played a central role in the attempts of social psychologists to understand human behavior (e.g., Fishbein and Ajzen, 1974; Ajzen, 1988; Pratkanis and Turner, 1994; Kraus, 1995) . Attitudes are summary evaluations of persons, objects, ideas, or activities along a dimension ranging from positive to negative. As Fishbein and Ajzen point out, "there is general agreement that a person's attitude towards some object constitutes a predisposition on his part to respond to the object in a consistently favorable or unfavorable manner" (1974, p. 59) . 1 To the extent 1 There is an extensive literature in the …eld of social psychology on the relationship between individual 1 that attitudes in ‡uence behavior, the objective of attaining collective goals translates into a problem of disseminating the attitudes that contribute to the attainment of those goals.
Individual attitudes are related in a systematic way to a number of things, including beliefs, values, personality and past behavior. However, members' attitudes are also affected by the attitudes of the organization members with whom they interact (e.g., Weiss
and Nowicki, 1981; Gri¢ n, 1983). Thus, an important managerial issue is to choose the organizational structure and procedures that best contribute to the dissemination of the desired attitudes throughout the organization. In this paper, we assume that the top manager's objective is to align members'attitudes with his/her own. Clearly, there are real life situations where diversity of attitudes may be bene…cial (e.g., March, 1996) . Some degree of heterogeneity among individuals may facilitate creativity and innovation, improving the adaptive capacity of the organization. In this paper, we focus on those situations where conformity is bene…cial and, as a result, the objective of the top manager is to align the members' attitudes with his/her own. For example, the top manager may be willing to disseminate a positive attitude towards customer-orientation, hard-working or social responsibility. Notice, however, that the general framework proposed in this paper can also be used to analyze the conditions under which diversity is produced. In fact, our model can be used to analyze the conditions under which the organization converges to any desired con…guration of attitudes, given the initial conditions and the dynamic process of attitude change.
We do not model the impact of attitudes on behavior explicitly. Instead, we borrow from social psychology the idea that, at least under certain circumstances, attitudes in ‡uence behavior and study the impact of organization on the dynamic process of attitude change.
attitudes and behavior (e.g., Fishbein and Ajzen, 1974; Fazio, 1986; Ajzen and Sexton, 1999) . Although some early studies, in particular the one conducted by LaPiere (1934) , indicated that attitudes were largely irrelevant to the prediction of behavior, recent empirical research con…rms that, in general, attitudes in ‡uence behavior (see, for an overview, Kraus, 1995) . However, the consistency of attitudes and behaviors has been found to depend on a number of factors, such as the level of e¤ort required to perform a behavior (e.g., Bagozzi, Yi and Baumgartner, 1990) , the accessability of the attitude from memory (e.g., Fazio, Powell and Williams, 1989) , the extent to which individual behavior is susceptible to situational or interpersonal cues, as opposed to inner states or dispositions (e.g., Ajzen, Timko and White, 1982) , and the consistency between the a¤ective and cognitive components of an attitude (e.g., Norman, 1975 ).
More speci…cally, we take the perspective of a top manager whose objective is to choose the organizational structure and the timing of information ‡ows that best contribute to align members'attitudes with his/her own.
We refer to organizational structure as the system of formal and informal communication channels that characterize an organization. Behind this notion is the recognition that important networks of informal communication often complement or bypass the systems of formal authority and the regulated channels. We identify two extreme types of organizational structures: the hierarchy and the network. Hierarchies and networks have been characterized in many ways in the literature (e.g., Hummon and Fararo, 1995; Carley and Lin, 1997) . In this paper, we use the words "hierarchy" and "network" in a very speci…c sense. We think of a hierarchy as a system in which the communication channels correspond to the links of authority that characterize the formal structure. The formal structure is composed of the set of positions in the organization, the way these positions are clustered, and the way the formal authority ‡ows among them (e.g., Mintzberg, 1983 ).
We de…ne the network as an organizational structure where the communication channels corresponding to the formal links of authority are complemented by a complex system of informal relationships between organization members, so that all the members within the organization are linked. We also consider all the intermediate situations between these two extreme cases. A hybrid organization is any intermediate structure, where some informal relationships exist and others do not.
As pointed out by Friedkin (1993) , the two components of social in ‡uence are interpersonal visibility and salience. Individual i's in ‡uence on individual j depends on j 's knowledge of i's attitude. Invisible attitudes cannot be directly in ‡uential. In line with
Friedkin (1993, p. 863), we assume that j knows i's attitude if i and j communicate with each other. Once j is aware of i's attitude, then i's in ‡uence on j depends on the salience or value of i's attitude for j. Irrelevant attitudes cannot directly in ‡uence j. Thus, by determining who communicates with whom, organizational structure may a¤ect the process of attitude change within the organization. For example, in a network the top manager is 3 able to exercise direct in ‡uence on subordinates in di¤erent levels of the organization; and the members'attitudes may reinforce each other. In contrast, in a hierarchy, the top manager contacts only his/her direct subordinates; and the possibility of mutual reinforcement of attitudes is lessened. These two scenarios are likely to have very di¤erent implications for top managers trying to change attitudes. However, it is not clear which of these two extreme structures better facilitates change. 2 The dynamic process of attitude change is modeled as follows. The attitude of each individual towards a given issue is assumed to be in one of two possible states: a "positive" attitude or a "negative" attitude. This assumption is justi…ed by our focus on the alignment of attitudes. In fact, two attitudes are said to be aligned if they have the same sign, no matter their absolute values. This explains our binary characterization of attitudes.
Consider an initial con…guration of attitudes and a given set of interactions among organizational members. These interactions are …xed and not supposed to change over time.
The attitude of each individual is a¤ected by two di¤erent things: his/her personal values and the in ‡uence exercised by others over him/her. These two in ‡uences may reinforce each other, if aligned, or have the opposite e¤ect. In the latter case, the stronger in ‡uence prevails. The system may or may not be in a stable situation. We say that the system is in a stable situation when the attitude of each individual is aligned with the combined impact of his/her personal values and the in ‡uence exercised by others over him/her. A model that describes how the system may evolve to a more stable con…guration is the one developed in the seminal paper by Hop…eld (1982) regarding the so-called neural network.
In this paper, we use the simplest version of the neural network model to describe the dynamic process of attitude change.
The structure of the organization, as described above, de…nes who communicates with whom and, therefore, who in ‡uences whom. However, the evolution of attitudes within the organization also depends on the timing of information ‡ows. By in ‡uencing who gets the new information …rst, top management may a¤ect the order in which individuals revise their attitudes. As a consequence, attitudes do not necessarily change all at the same time.
Thus, we consider two classes of dynamics of attitude change: the simultaneous dynamics and the sequential dynamics. In the simultaneous dynamics information ‡ows quickly in the organization, so that all the members adjust their attitudes simultaneously. This scenario may be understood as corresponding to the situation where issues are discussed openly, with a high level of participation, so that attitudes change almost simultaneously.
In the sequential dynamics, individuals adjust their attitudes sequentially, from the top of the organization to the bottom. This scenario may represent the situation where issues are discussed within subgroups, starting at the top of the organization. 3 The evolution of attitudes in an organization depends not only on its structure and on the timing of information ‡ows, but also on the initial con…guration of attitudes. Two di¤erent types of initial con…gurations appear to be particularly interesting: the supported leader case and the non-supported leader case. The supported leader case corresponds to the situation where at least half of the members in each organizational level have a positive attitude. The non-supported leader corresponds to the situation where, in each organizational level, the number of individuals with a positive attitude is less than the number of individuals with a negative attitude. In the discussion of the non-supported leader case, we pay special attention to the case of an isolated leader, which corresponds to the situation where a leader tries to change the attitude of the rest of the organization, which is opposed to his/her own. 4 This captures important elements of the situation often faced by top managers when initiating a change process in their organizations. 5 In all these cases, the problem faced by the top manager is to choose the organizational structure and the timing of information ‡ows that favor the alignment of individuals'attitudes with his/her own. This paper studies this problem in the context of organizations with an arbitrarily large number of hierarchical levels and an arbitrarily large number of individuals per level. By doing so, we overcome the limitations, pointed out by Watts (1999) , associated with models with a relatively small number of members. The consideration of arbitrarily large organizations is important to ensure an accurate understanding of the forces underlying the dynamic process of in ‡uence and attitude change in organizations.
We identify three factors that determine the optimal organizational structure and the extent to which the alignment of attitudes is achieved: (1) clustering e¤ects, i.e., the existence, in the formal structure, of clusters of individuals with a given attitude that only communicate with members with the same attitude; (2) member cross-in ‡uence e¤ects, that result from direct peer contact and from all the direct diagonal relationships and override of authority chain contacts excluding the top manager; and (3) leader crossin ‡uence e¤ects, that result from all the direct diagonal relationships and override of authority chain contacts including the top manager. For each initial con…guration of attitudes, the interplay of these factors determines the optimal organizational structure.
We show that in the supported leader case, the network is an optimal structure where consensus is attained. In contrast, in the non-supported leader case, we identify conditions under which the hierarchy dominates the network. In the speci…c case of an isolated leader, we specify circumstances under which the hierarchy is optimal, leading to the desired the rest of the organization. Independently of the initial con…guration of attitudes, we consider throughout the paper both top-down and bottom-up in ‡uences. 5 As mentioned by Kotter and Heskett (1992) , e¤ort toward major change is often initiated by leaders who "either came into their positions from outside their …rms, came to their …rms after an early career somewhere else, 'grew up' outside the core of their companies or were unconventional in some other way" (1992, page 89). As a result, these leaders tend to bring with them perspectives, personal values and attitudes that are di¤erent from the ones that are dominant within their organizations. Kotter and Heskett (1992) o¤er an interesting description and analysis of major change processes that occured in several large organizations. Other important references on the topic of organizational change are Kanter, Stein and Jick (1992) and Jick (1993) . 6 consensus. When analyzing the relationship between the timing of information ‡ows and attitude change in organizations, we identify two types of situations where the choice of dynamics is irrelevant. First, this may happen because, for the initial con…guration of attitudes and organizational structure considered, the system converges to the desired equilibrium, independently of the dynamics. The dynamics may also be irrelevant because the two dynamics lead to the same …nal equilibrium where the leader is isolated. In addition, we specify conditions under which the choice of dynamics makes a di¤erence. In particular, we show that the sequential dynamics may dominate, or be dominated, by the simultaneous dynamics. 
Related Literature
Our paper is closely related to the research on networks of interpersonal interaction. Subsequent to the important work by Lewin (e.g., 1951), several psychologists studied social in ‡uence in groups (e.g., Festinger, Schachter and Back, 1950; Newcomb, 1961; Cartwright and Zander, 1968) . However, as pointed out by Eagly and Chaiken (1993, p. 660) , research by psychologists has been predominantly focusing on the psychological processes that mediate in ‡uence. In contrast, there is an extensive literature, developed by sociologists, on social networks (e.g., Marsden, 1981; Friedkin, 1993 ; see Stokman, 2001 , for an overview).
Recognizing that much of the real work in organizations happens despite the formal organization, this literature pays attention to the networks of relationships that individuals form while interacting. In particular, our paper is closely related to the network theory of social in ‡uence developed by Friedkin and Johnsen (e.g., Friedkin, 1986 Friedkin, , 1991 Friedkin, , 1998 Johnsen, 1990, 1997) , which builds on the early work of French (1956) and Harary (1959) . Assuming that the top manager's objective is to align members' attitudes with his/her own, we discuss how the optimal choices depend on the initial con…guration of attitudes.
To accomplish this, we propose a model that allows for arbitrary initial con…gurations of attitudes, which are treated as independent of other exogenous variables. In contrast to our work, in the models mentioned above the initial con…guration of attitudes is uniquely determined by a set of exogenous variables. Second, while in the existing models the rule governing the change of opinions is typically linear, in ours the rule is highly nonlinear.
This results from our emphasis on the alignment of attitudes. We say that two attitudes are aligned with each other if and only if they have the same sign. To focus on the sign of attitudes, we use a binary model, i.e., a model where attitudes may be either positive or negative. This naturally implies a highly nonlinear dynamics. Third, while in Friedkin and Johnsen's model individuals revise their positions by taking weighted averages of the in ‡uential positions of other members, meaning that the weights sum up to one, we do not have to impose this restriction to ensure the convergence of the change process. 6 Finally, our analysis di¤ers from the one proposed by these authors by explicitly considering di¤erent dynamics. In spite of acknowledging the possibility that in ‡uences are exercised sequentially (e.g., Friedkin and Johnsen, 1990, p. 195 There have been other attempts to model the …rm's internal organization as a commu-nication network. For instance, one of the most in ‡uential approaches to the problem of organizational design developed by economists, the theory of teams (e.g., Marschak and Radner, 1972; and Radner, 1992) , studies the e¢ cient use of information in an informationally decentralized organization. This theory focuses on the incomplete and heterogeneous dissemination of information among the several decision makers, on the characterization of decision functions that are optimal given that decentralization and, …nally, on the comparison of alternative (decentralized) information structures under the assumption that each one will be used e¢ ciently. A related perspective on the problem of organizational design is proposed by Stiglitz (1985 and ). These authors look at certain aspects of an organization which they refer to as architecture. 
The Model
Consider an organization composed of N individuals. 8 The attitude of each individual may be described by one of two possible states, a "positive"or a "negative"attitude, depending on how the agent feels about a certain issue. The state of this organization of N individuals at a given time t is described by the vector of attitudes (s 1 (t); s 2 (t); : : : ; s N (t)); where each
; N represents the attitude of an individual. 9 Without loss of generality, we assume that the top manager's initial attitude is positive, Conversely, a negative value of J ij means that a given attitude of i tends to in ‡uence j's attitude in the opposite direction. The intensity of the in ‡uence of i over j is given by the absolute value of J ij . We assume that in ‡uences are reciprocal, in the sense that if individual i in ‡uences individual j, then j also in ‡uences i. 10 In other words, J ij = 0 ,
Consider a sequence of points in time, t = 1; 2; 3; : : : For a given set of attitudes at time t, the j-th attitude is updated at time t + 1 based on three factors: the attitudes of the other members at time t, the in ‡uence of each of them on j, and the strength of 
Notice that s j tends to align with the personal values j and with the attitudes of those who have a positive in ‡uence over j (J ij > 0). In addition, it tends to align negatively (or disalign) with the attitudes of those who have a negative in ‡uence over j (J ij < 0).
The rule in equation (1) de…nes how the attitude of a given member changes. It describes how the attitude of an individual at time t + 1 is in ‡uenced by the attitudes of the other individuals at time t. We still have to specify whether the above equation applies to all individuals at the same time, or whether they update their attitudes sequentially.
We consider both the simultaneous and the sequential dynamics. Under the simultaneous dynamics, everybody revises his/her attitude simultaneously. Under the sequential dynamics, attitudes are revised sequentially, according to a pre-speci…ed order.
A set of attitudes is said to be in equilibrium when the con…guration attains a …xed point under the speci…ed dynamics. The relevant issue in this model is to characterize the equilibrium con…guration under di¤erent conditions.
In our model, the top manager is seen as a change agent that tries to disseminate his/her attitude through the organization. In this context, it makes sense to assume that the top manager's personal values and beliefs, given by 1 ; are so strong that his/her attitude does not change when he/she is subject to the in ‡uence of the rest of the organization.
Under the assumption that the top manager's objective is to align members'attitudes with his/her own, we say that the optimal organizational structure is the one that maximizes the number of individuals that share the top manager's attitude, assumed to be positive. Clearly, the ideal organizational structures are those where the entire organization converts to a positive attitude. And the worst possible structures are those leading to an equilibrium where all individuals reach a negative attitude. When the system reaches an equilibrium where some individuals have a positive attitude and others have a negative attitude, the larger the number of individuals with a positive attitude, the better. 12 The evolution of attitudes depends on the matrix of interactions, the nature of the dynamics, and the initial con…guration of attitudes. We now specify each element of the model used to analyze attitude change in organizations.
Organizational Structures
We consider an organization with the following formal structure. Let l = 1; 2; :::; K label the di¤erent levels of authority. In each level l there are, say, n l elements ordered as i = 1; 2; :::; n l . Let n 1 = 1. Each individual is formally subordinated by an authority link to one individual in the next upper level l 1; except, of course, when l = 1. Also, the i-th individual of level l is the direct superior of q il individuals in the next lower level l + 1;
except, obviously, when l = K. Thus, n l+1 = P n l i=1 q il for all l 1: The formal structure does not incorporate the informal relationships that often complement the regulated system of authority. Therefore, it may or may not correspond to the structure of communication channels within the organization. The two extreme organizational structures, the hierarchy and the network, are characterized as follows. In the hierarchy, the communication channels correspond to the formal links of authority. In particular, we de…ne the matrix of in ‡uences J h , where J h ij represents the intensity of the in ‡uence of individual i over individual j, as follows
As mentioned above, individual i's ability to in ‡uence individual j depends, not only on his/her interpersonal visibility, but also on the salience or value of i's attitude for j (e.g., Friedkin, 1993) . Irrelevant attitudes cannot directly in ‡uence j: We consider that is in ‡uenced by the individuals in level 2, but with less intensity. This is expressed by In particular, we de…ne the matrix of in ‡uences J n , where J n ij represents the intensity of the in ‡uence of individual i over individual j; as
if i is a subordinate of j e if i is at the same level as j 0 otherwise Again, we assume that each element in ‡uences all the elements in lower levels equally, with intensity u > 0. This is expressed by J n 1j = u for all j. It is also assumed that every element in ‡uences all individuals in upper levels equally, with intensity d > 0 and d < u. 13 The assumption that u > d can also be justi…ed by the fact that managers control several factors that may a¤ect values, beliefs and attitudes of their subordinates (Harrison and Carroll, 1991) . In the same vein, the in ‡uence exercised by superiors over subordinates encompasses not only an element of conformity, whereby an agent simply follows the behavior of another agent, but also an element of obedience, which results from enforcement by an authority (Elsenbroich and Xenitidou, 2012) .
Finally, since all relationships are considered, we include the in ‡uence among individuals within the same hierarchical level. Whatever the considered level, their reciprocal in ‡uence is assumed to be given by e > 0 with e < u.
A hybrid structure is any intermediate case, where some informal relationships exist and others do not. In a hybrid structure the communication channels corresponding to the formal links of authority are complemented by an incomplete network of informal communications. Any hybrid structure is characterized by an in ‡uence matrix J as follows.
If J ij is di¤erent from zero in the hierarchy, then it has the same value in any hybrid structure. At least one of the other o¤-diagonal elements of the J matrix of the hybrid organization is positive, and at least one is zero. Furthermore, all non-zero elements of this matrix have the same value as in matrix J n . 14 
Simultaneous and Sequential Dynamics
In this section, we describe the implementation of the di¤erent dynamics. We assume that personal values and beliefs are relatively weak, so that in ‡uences play a relevant role.
Obviously, if personal values and beliefs are relatively strong, individual attitudes do not change. More speci…cally, we assume that j = 0 for all j > 1. As already mentioned, we also assume that 1 is su¢ ciently large for the top manager's attitude not to change.
Simultaneous Dynamics
From equation (1), the total in ‡uence over element j at time t is given by
If h i (t) is positive, the j-th element will have a positive attitude at time t + 1; if h j (t)
is negative,the j-th element will have a negative attitude at time t + 1.
In the simultaneous dynamics all individuals revise their attitudes at the same time.
Hence, at time t + 1; s j (t + 1) = sign h j (t): The equilibrium con…guration of attitudes at time t is given by s j (t)h j (t) > 0, for all j.
Sequential Dynamics
In the sequential dynamics, attitudes are revised starting from the top of the formal structure to the bottom, in repeated cycles until an equilibrium is reached. We assume that, in each cycle, the sequence of attitude change in each level follows the numbering given to the individuals in that level.
; where [a] denotes the integer part of the real number a. For an initial con…guration fs 1 (0); s 2 (0); : : : ; s N (0)g, this dynamics implies that the con…guration of attitudes at any future time t is given by s j (t) =sign h j (t 1) and
Equilibrium is reached at the …rst time t such that s i (t)h i (t) > 0, for all i. At this point in time, the attained con…guration becomes invariant, by construction. 
Initial Con…gurations of Attitudes

Results
We now characterize the equilibrium con…guration of attitudes under di¤erent scenarios.
Supported Leader
Consider …rst the supported leader case. In the hierarchy, for any dynamics the ability of the top manager to disseminate his/her attitude depends on the in ‡uence exercised by superiors over subordinates. In contrast, in the network the attitude of the top manager prevails independently of the dynamics and of the in ‡uence exercised by superiors over subordinates. Hence, the network is an optimal organizational structure, (weakly) dominating not only the hierarchy, but also all hybrid structures.
Proposition 4.1 In the supported leader case, the network is an optimal structure and leads, under both dynamics, to an equilibrium where all individuals have the same attitude as the top manager.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In the supported leader case, the informal relationships that characterize the network help the top manager in imposing his/her initial attitude. In the hierarchy, there are typically clusters of individuals with a negative attitude that do not interact with individuals having the opposite attitude. This clustering e¤ect makes attitude change more di¢ cult.
In the network and in hybrid organizations, there is another e¤ect, the cross-in ‡uence e¤ect, that may help overcome this problem. This e¤ect results from the informal relationships that characterize these organizational structures. In the network, since at least half of the members in each level have a positive attitude, the cross-in ‡uence e¤ect leads to the di¤usion of the top-manger's attitude.
It follows from this proposition that, under the optimal organizational structure, the network, the ability of the top manager to impose his/her initial attitude does not depend upon the dynamics under consideration.
Corollary 4.1 In the supported leader case, under the network the dynamics is irrelevant.
The key di¤erence between the sequential dynamics and the simultaneous dynamics is that in the former individuals in upper levels revise their attitudes before exercising their in ‡uence over individuals in lower levels. In the supported leader case, under a network the order by which individuals in di¤erent levels revise their attitudes is irrelevant.
Independently of the dynamics, the …eld felt by each individual is positive because, in each level, the number of individuals with a positive attitude is greater or equal than the number of individuals with a negative attitude and everybody communicates with everybody.
It also follows from Proposition 4.1 that, under the network, the ability of the leader to impose his/her attitude does not depend on the value of u. 
Non-Supported Leader
The characterization of the optimal organization in the case of a non-supported leader is more problematic. In this section, after deriving some results for the general case, we concentrate on the particular case of an isolated leader.
General Case
In contrast with the supported leader case, here the network is not necessarily an optimal structure, leading to an equilibrium where all individuals have a positive attitude. We …rst identify conditions under which in equilibrium the network leads to an isolated leader. subordinates is su¢ ciently small, under the network the member cross-in ‡uence e¤ect dominates the leader cross-in ‡uence e¤ect and, as a result, the system converges to the isolated leader case.
We now establish su¢ cient conditions for the hierarchy to be preferred to the network.
In particular, for a two-level organization, i.e. K = 2; the result is trivial. Under the assumed initial conditions of a non-supported leader, the hierarchy will always lead to a …nal con…guration where all individuals attain a positive attitude, whereas the result in a network depends on the relative value of u=d and on the number of individuals with positive attitude in the second level. Hence, for K = 2 the network is the worst solution, always dominated by the hierarchy. The following Proposition establishes a su¢ cient condition for the hierarchy to dominate the network as a function of the number of organizational levels.
Proposition 4.3
In the non-supported leader case, a su¢ cient condition for the hierarchy to be preferred to the network is that the number of levels in the organization is large enough.
In the hierarchy, there are typically clusters of individuals with a negative attitude that do not interact with individuals having the opposite attitude. As we saw, this clustering e¤ect makes attitude change more di¢ cult. In the non-supported leader case, the crossin ‡uence e¤ect associated with the network may reinforce this problem. This happens if the combined impact of the negative informal in ‡uences each individual su¤ers dominates the combined impact of the positive informal in ‡uences. The larger the number of organizational levels, the stronger these negative informal in ‡uences under the network. Thus, if the number of levels is su¢ ciently large, the hierarchy dominates the network.
Isolated Leader
In the isolated leader case it is possible to establish su¢ cient conditions under which the hierarchy is optimal. For that purpose it is convenient to derive some intermediate results.
We …rst identify su¢ cient conditions for the equilibrium con…guration to coincide with the initial con…guration.
Lemma 4.1 In the isolated leader case, under both dynamics a su¢ cient condition for any organizational structure to lead to an equilibrium with the initial con…guration is that any agent in the second level has a su¢ ciently large span of control.
Proof. See the Appendix. We are now in position to establish su¢ cient conditions under which the hierarchy is optimal, independently of the initial con…guration of attitudes. Proof. See the Appendix.
The intuition is straightforward. If the maximum number of subordinates of any member is su¢ ciently small, the adverse clustering e¤ect associated with the hierarchy is not an obstacle to the dissemination of the top manager's attitude. In such cases, the crossin ‡uence e¤ect associated with the network or a hybrid organization can only lead to the mutual reinforcement of the members'initial attitudes, making change more di¢ cult.
We may now state the following result concerning the optimal organizational structure in the isolated leader case.
Proposition 4.5
In the isolated leader case, the hierarchy is an optimal structure under both dynamics if all agents in the second level have the same number of subordinates and if no other agent has as many subordinates.
Since all individuals, with the exception of the top manager, have an initial negative attitude, the member cross-in ‡uence e¤ect makes attitude change more problematic.
To understand the role of the leader cross-in ‡uence e¤ect, it is convenient to distinguish two situations. If the level of in ‡uence exercised by superiors over subordinates is su¢ -ciently large, the adverse clustering e¤ect is not a problem and, as a result, the leader cross-in ‡uence e¤ect, although strong, is unnecessary. If the in ‡uence of superiors over subordinates is su¢ ciently small, the leader cross-in ‡uence e¤ect is too week to make a di¤erence. Thus, under the conditions speci…ed in this proposition, the hierarchy is an optimal structure.
It follows from Proposition 4.5 that, for the speci…ed conditions, under the optimal structure the dynamics is irrelevant. To understand the intuition for this result, consider the following. In the isolated leader case, under the hierarchy, if no other agent has as many subordinates as those in level two, a necessary condition for the top manager's attitude to prevail is that, in the …rst time individuals in level two revise their attitudes, they assume a positive attitude. In other words, either the top manager is able to change the attitude of the individuals in level 2, or it is not possible for the top manager's attitude to prevail in the organization. Furthermore, if the top manager is able to change the attitudes of all managers in level two and no other agent has as many subordinates as those in level two, the attitude of individuals in lower levels will also change, independently of the order by which individuals in di¤erent levels revise their attitudes. As a result, the dynamics is irrelevant.
In general, the ability of the top manager to change the members'attitudes depends on the level of in ‡uence exercised by superiors over subordinates. The following Corollary establishes necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the top manager's attitude to prevail.
Corollary 4.4
In the isolated leader case, under any organizational structure, a necessary condition for the leader to change the prevailing attitude in the organization is that the number of subordinates of individuals in the second level is su¢ ciently low; under the hierarchy, this is a su¢ cient condition. The larger the in ‡uence exercised by superiors over subordinates, the larger the required span of control for which this result holds.
The necessary condition results from the fact that the leader has to convince at least the second-level manager who has less subordinates (all with negative attitudes). The su¢ cient condition under the hierarchy corresponds to the situation where any positiveattitude superior converts his/her direct subordinates, since the in ‡uence from above is larger than the aggregate in ‡uence from below.
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The 
Optimal Dynamics
Our results for the supported leader and isolated leader cases seem to indicate that the dynamics is irrelevant. However, depending on the initial con…guration of attitudes, this may not hold. In this section, we identify conditions under which the dynamics is relevant and irrelevant, both for the network and the hierarchy.
Relevance of the Dynamics: Network
In the …rst part of this section we identify su¢ cient conditions for the dynamics to be irrelevant under a network and use these conditions to explain the results in the former sections.
The results about the relevance or irrelevance of the dynamics are crucially determined by the comparison of the attitude of each individual with H l (t) ; a measure of the in ‡uence exercised by all organizational members over a member in a level l of the organization under a network. More speci…cally, we de…ne the variable
is the …eld felt at time t by individual i in level l, and the term es il (t) is added to ensure that the …nal variable does not depend on the considered individual i. We now show that
is the same for all individuals in a given level at each point in time.
Lemma 4.2 The measure of in ‡uence H l (t) is the same for all individuals in a given level at each point in time.
We are now in position to derive su¢ cient conditions for the dynamics to be irrelevant.
Proof. See Appendix. We now identify a su¢ cient condition under which the dynamics is relevant. Proof. See the Appendix.
In the network, any individual in level l such that the aggregate in ‡uence exercised over him/her is relatively weak, i.e., H l 2 ] 1; 1[, changes his/her attitude during the process of revision of attitude. Consider …rst the case where the initial attitude of individual i in level l is negative, or s il (t) = 1: Since H l (t) = [h il (t) + es il (t)]=e; it follows that h il (t) > 0 and individual i will revise his/her attitude to become positive. As a result, H l will become larger than +1 and the …eld felt by any other individual in that level will be positive. In this case, the …rst individual to revise his/her attitude is a "positive trigger", as he/she triggers the dissemination of a positive attitude. In a similar way, if the initial attitude is positive, i.e., s il (t) = +1; then h il (t) < 0 and individual i will revise his/her attitude to become negative. As a result, H l will become smaller than 1 and the …eld felt by any other individual in that level will be negative. In this case, the …rst individual to revise his/her attitude is a "negative trigger", as he/she triggers the dissemination of 
Relevance of the Dynamics: Hierarchy
We now consider the case of the hierarchy. We start by characterizing su¢ cient conditions under which the dynamics is irrelevant. Proof. See the Appendix.
This proposition proves that if the maximum span of control in the organization is su¢ ciently low the dynamics is irrelevant, because all …nal attitudes become positive independently of the dynamics. 15 We now show that the dynamics may also be irrelevant even if there are individuals in the organization with a larger span of control, provided that some additional conditions are satis…ed. Proof. See the Appendix.
Under the sequential dynamics, the positive attitude of the top manager guarantees the dissemination of his/her attitude throughout the organization. In the …rst step of the dynamics the top manager induces a positive attitude on all his/her direct subordinates, since the number of subordinates with a negative attitude is limited. In the second step each of those subordinates induces a positive attitude on all of his/her own subordinates, and so on. Under the simultaneous dynamics, although the second level of the organization will convert entirely to the positive attitude (as in the sequential dynamics), not all elements in the third level will necessarily be contaminated by that positive attitude. The reason is that the …rst step of the simultaneous dynamics may increase signi…cantly the number of fourth-level agents with negative attitudes.
The following 
Conclusion
In this paper, we use a formal model to analyze the dynamic process of attitude transmission and change in organizations. As suggested by Harrison and Carroll (1991: 554) , there are important managerial reasons to study the processes of in ‡uence in organizations, since managers have some degree of control over their main determinants (see also Schein, 1985 ; O'Reilly, 1989). In particular, we focus on the problem faced by top management of choosing the organizational structure and the timing of information ‡ows that favour the dissemination of the desired attitudes throughout the organization. We identify three underlying factors that determine the optimal organizational structure and the extent to which the alignment of attitudes is achieved: (1) clustering e¤ects, i.e., the existence, in the formal structure, of clusters of individuals with a given attitude that only communicate with members with the same attitude; (2) member cross-in ‡uence e¤ects, that result from direct peer contact and from all the direct diagonal relationships and override of authority chain contacts excluding the top manager; and (3) leader cross-in ‡uence e¤ects, that result from all the direct diagonal relationships and override of authority chain contacts including the top manager. For each initial con…guration of attitudes, the interplay of these factors determines the optimal organizational structure.
More speci…cally, we show that in the supported leader case, the network is an optimal structure where consensus is attained. While in the hierarchy clustering e¤ects typically make attitude change more di¢ cult, the leader and member cross-in ‡uence e¤ects associated with the network help overcome this problem, because at least half of the members in each level have a positive attitude. This result is consistent with the idea that the socialization process can be managed to intensify the dissemination of a given corporate We also analyze the relationship between the timing of information ‡ows and attitude change in organizations. We identify two types of situations where the choice of dynamics is irrelevant. First, this may happen because, for the initial con…guration of attitudes and organizational structure considered, the system converges to the desired equilibrium, independently of the dynamics. The dynamics may also be irrelevant because the two dynamics lead to the same …nal equilibrium where the leader is isolated. In addition, we specify conditions under which the choice of dynamics makes a di¤erence. By in ‡uenc-ing the degree of participation and the order by which individuals revise their attitudes, the top manager may in ‡uence the equilibrium con…guration of attitudes. In particular,
we show that, depending on the order by which individuals in a given level revise their attitudes, the sequential dynamics may dominate, or be dominated, by the simultaneous dynamics. This means that the choice of dynamics is a non-trivial problem deserving careful attention. Our results may have interesting implications for the network theory of social in ‡uence developed by Friedkin and Johnsen (e.g., Friedkin, 1986 Friedkin, , 1991 Friedkin, , 1998 Johnsen 1990, 1997) . In spite of acknowledging the possibility that in ‡uences are exercised sequentially, these authors focus on the simultaneous dynamics. Although Another possible extension is to consider some negative in ‡uences in the organization.
In this paper, we assume that all the in ‡uences are positive, meaning that when two individuals with equal attitudes interact, their attitudes are reinforced. If negative in ‡uences are considered, then the opposite e¤ect is produced: when two individuals with equal at-titudes interact, their attitudes tend to disalign. This negative in ‡uence may arise in real organizations from the existence of competition, distrust, animosity or sense of separate identity between pairs of individuals. In our model this situation corresponds to making some parameters J ij negative.
This paper may also be extended by assuming that attitude change is not deterministic.
In our model, we assume that the change of j-th attitude occurs according to the rule given in equation (1) with certainty. Alternatively, one may consider that in ‡uences create nothing more than a predisposition for attitude maintenance or change, so that attitudes may or may not evolve according to the rule given by equation (1). Non-deterministic behavior is caused by noise originated, for example, by misunderstandings. This situation may be modeled by assigning a probability p > 1=2 to the attitude given by the rule in equation (1) and 1 p to the opposite attitude. It may also be interesting to study the situation where, ex-ante, each individual in the organization (except the top manager) has an equal probability of having either a negative or a positive attitude. This would force a discussion of the optimality of the various structures and dynamics when the precise "location"of attitudes is not known ex-ante.
An additional extension would be to consider that individuals in ‡uence each other strategically. When there are executives and managers with authority to make discretionary decisions, a¤ected employees may try to in ‡uence their decisions. Several authors have studied the ways in which careful organizational choices can, at least partially, control the direct costs of in ‡uence activities (e.g., Holmström and Ricart i Costa, 1986; Milgrom, 1988) . A related question is how the attempt to in ‡uence the organization's decisions a¤ects the dynamic process of social in ‡uence and attitude change. Building on the social exchange model proposed by Coleman (1972 Coleman ( , 1973 , Marsden (1981) proposes a model where individuals may in ‡uence each other strategically, in the pursuit of their individual goals. However, his model does not incorporate a dynamic process of in ‡uence. In fact, he assumes that individuals in ‡uence each other only once, and does not study how the repeated interplay of the in ‡uence process leads to an equilibrium con…guration of inter-ests. For simplicity, we ignore this kind of strategic behavior, assuming that any chosen organizational structure determines the matrix J. Notice, however, that much observed behavior in organizations is not truly strategic. Attitudes often change simply because individuals understand and are in ‡uenced by how others really evaluate a given object.
In this perspective, this paper studies how this kind of in ‡uence depends on the system of communication channels and on the timing of information ‡ows that characterize an organization.
Appendix
In this appendix, we present the proofs of our results.
Proof of Proposition 4.1
In the network, the i-th individual of level l is under a …eld
where n + k and n k denote the number of individuals at level k starting with a positive and negative attitude, respectively. Since u > e, the assumption that n 
Proof of Corollary 4.2
Follows from the proof of Proposition 4.1.
Proof of Proposition 4.2
For K > 2, from expression (2) ; it follows that h il < 0 under the assumed conditions, since n + k n k < 0 for all k > 1. For l = 2; the …eld reads h n i2 = (u es i2 ) + e(n + 2
n k ) and, if u < (K 2)d; the result follows no matter what dynamics is used.
Proof of Proposition 4.3
Under the hierarchy
with il = P i 1 k=1 q kl and p denoting the superior of i: Notice that, by construction, for l > 2; we have h h il (t) > u dq il : For l = 2; we have h h i2 (t) > u dq i2 : Under the network, we have from expression (2)
For l > 2; we have
and for l > 2,
If both conditions above are satis…ed, the hierarchy is preferred to the network. From the result above, we know that a su¢ cient condition is that q il max[K 2;
, it follows that the hierarchy is preferred to the network if K > q + 4, where q denotes the maximum number of subordinates of any agent in the organization.
Proof of Lemma 4.1
In the network, we know from equation (2) that
Since in this case n + k = 0 and n k = n and s il = 1 for all i > 1; we have
Since 1 P 1<k<l n k < 0 for l > 2 and n l 1; we have h il < 0 for all l > 2: For l = 2;
Let q m l = min i q il denote the minimum number of subordinates of any agent in level l. Since P k>2 n k q m 2 and n 2 > 1; we have h n i2 < 0; leading to our result. In the hierarchy, equation (3) Notice that, by construction,
Since s 11 = +1; u > q d implies h i2 (t) > 0 for all i = 1; : : : ; n 2 and for all t 0: Consider …rst the sequential dynamics starting at t = 0: For t n 2 ; we have s i2 (t) = +1; 8i; leading to h i3 (t) > 0 for all i = 1; : : : ; n 3 . In general, if t P k=2 n k ; we have s ik (t) = +1; 8i; for all k . Hence, at t = N the system attains the …xed point con…guration where Under the sequential dynamics, starting with an individual with a negative attitude, we get for n l > 0
Therefore, due to the levels where H l 2 ] 1; 1[ ;the sequential dynamics starting with an individual with a negative attitude is preferred to the simultaneous dynamics, which, in turn, is preferred to the sequential dynamics starting with an individual with a positive attitude.
Proof of Proposition 4.8
It is convenient to start by characterizing what happens with the attitude of an arbitrary individual under both dynamics.
The …eld felt by individual i in level l, given by equation (3), can be rewritten as
where P i;l denotes the sum over all subordinates of individual i at level l, and p denotes his/her superior. Let q il denote the total number of direct subordinates, n + il (t) denote the number of subordinates with a positive attitude at time t; and n il (t) denote the number of subordinates with a negative attitude. Then, n + il (t) + n il (t) = q il and the …eld above can be rewritten as
Also, let q denote the maximum number of subordinates that any agent has in the organization, i.e., 
The result of the proposition follows from the comparison of these two equations.
Consider an individual i in level l, whose superior has a positive attitude and does not change it, i.e., s p;l 1 (t) = s p;l 1 (t + 1) = +1. Under the assumption that q il q < u=d, it follows from equations (6) and (7) that s i;l (t + 2) = +1 under both dynamics. Each of its subordinates will then have a superior with a positive attitude in the next step of the dynamics and the argument applies again until all agents under the initial superior attains a positive attitude. Since the head of the organization (the individual in l = 1) has a positive attitude at time t = 0 that does not change by design, the argument may apply initially to each of the individuals in level l = 2 and then for all other levels. Since the argument does not depend on the dynamics, the result follows.
In the case where q = u=d, the above argument follows obviously for every individual i in level l such that q il < q . Let us focus on the …rst individual such that q il = q = u=d.
Knowing that his/her superior has attained a positive attitude at some point under either dynamics, we consider three cases.
If at least one of his subordinates has a positive attitude. It follows that n + il (t) > 0 ) h il (t) > 0 and the above argument still holds for both dynamics, leading to s il (t + 1) = +1. This clearly implies that s il (t + 2) = +1 under both dynamics, since the worst that may happen is that in the simultaneous dynamics all his/her subordinates have changed into negative attitudes at t + 1, leading to a null resulting …eld and s sim il (t + 2) = s seq il (t + 2) = +1. However, we are left to show that if n + il = 0, his/her …nal attitude does not depend on the dynamics. This leads to the two following cases.
If the focal individual has a positive attitude s i;l (t) = +1 and all his/her subordinates have a negative attitude, then n + il (t) = 0 ) h il (t) = 0 ) s il (t + 1) = +1 under both dynamics, by the argument just described.
If the focal individual has a negative attitude s i;l (t) = 1 and all his/her subordinates have a negative attitude, then for the sequential dynamics n + il (t) = 0 ) s seq il (t + 2) = 1. Notice that in the sequential dynamics all the subordinates of the focal individual will remain with negative attitudes in subsequent times since they have at most q subordinates themselves (by de…nition of q ) and even if all these have a positive attitude, the fact that u = q d constrains change. This same argument applies in the case of the simultaneous dynamics. Here, either signh kl+1 (t) = s k;l+1 (t + 1) = 1 for all the subordinates of the focal individual and s sim il (t + 2) = s seq il (t + 2) from (7) and (6), or h kl+1 (t) = 0 for some subordinate, leaving its attitude s k;l+1 (t + 1) = 1 negative and sustaining s sim il (t + 2) = s seq il (t + 2). This concludes our proof.
Proof of Proposition 4.9
We show that under the hierarchy if the number of subordinates of any agent is larger than u=d and the maximum span q is strictly larger than u=d, a su¢ cient condition for the dynamics to be irrelevant is that, for all agents, the number of subordinates with a negative attitude is larger than half of the sum of u=d with the number of subordinates, i.e., n il > 1 2 (q i;l + u=d) for all i; l. The condition q il u=d ensures that Under the simultaneous dynamics, the argument above holds for l > 2 leading to s pl 1 (t + 1) = sign h pl 1 (t) = 1 and s kl+1 (t + 1) = sign h kl+1 (t) = 1:
From equation (7) we conclude that for l 2 s sim il (t + 2) = 1 thus concluding our proof.
Proof of Proposition 4.10
We show that under the hierarchy if the number of subordinates of any agent is larger than u=d and the maximum span q is strictly larger than u=d, a su¢ cient condition for the dynamics to be relevant is that, for all agents, the number of subordinates with a negative attitude is less than half of the sum of u=d with the number of subordinates, i.e., (q i;l + u=d). In the second step of the dynamics a subordinate of one such individual will feel a …eld that may be negative for the very same reason, increasing the number of negative subordinates in the system. This shows that, under the conditions of this proposition, the sequential dynamics is preferred, thus concluding our proof. 
Nova School of Business and Economics
